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The Federal regulation-writing process is vital to understanding
how laws are translated into policy. This paper re-examines data
on human services interest groups active in lobbying the execu-
tive branch to determine what factors influence their effectiveness.
Building on findings from Hoefer (2000), structural equation
modeling is used to re-analyze the original regression model of in-
terest group effectiveness (IGE) on a sample of 127 Washington
D.C.-based interest groups. Results indicate that some of the pre-
vious findings are not supported and an alternative model is pro-
posed. A group's position, context and access to information and
policymakers emerge as significant determinants of IGE. Access
also mediates the impact of a group's strategy and position on
IGE. Implications for practice and future research are provided.
Keywords: human services, interest groups, regulations, policy,
advocacy, structural equation modeling, policymaking
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Regulatory politics-the struggle for control over the
administrative levers of power and policy shaped
within government agencies-is central to government
activity in the United States (Harris and Milkus, 1989,
p. viii).
Regulations control implementation of laws. This vital
fact concerning the policy process can often be overlooked in
the euphoria of winning a legislative battle or in the dispirit-
ing crush of losing a vote. Either way, significant opportuni-
ties exist in the post-legislative process to affect policy, a fact
noted in the scant social work literature on the subject (Albert
1983; Bell & Bell 1982; Haynes & Mickelson 1997; Hoefer 2000;
Jansson 1999). Most of this social work literature, however, is
concerned with explaining what the regulatory process is and
how it fits into the policy process rather than with research-
ing how best to affect the process, particularly for the interest
groups that try on a daily basis to affect policy.
Moving the administrative levers of policy requires in-
fluence and power. Interest groups that understand the im-
portance of regulatory policymaking want to be as effective
as possible in their pursuit of this task. The study of interest
group effectiveness (IGE) (a type of political power) is a subject
of great interest and importance, yet one that is controversial
because skeptics doubt that the concept can ever be measured.
The search for interest group influence has been equated with
"a blind man searching for a black cat in the coal bin at mid-
night" (Loomis 1983, p. 194). Less lyrically, Sloof (1998, p. 247)
states: "...the prospects for a comprehensive model of the po-
litical influence of competing interest groups on government
policy look rather dim."
The major problem with demonstrating interest group in-
fluence is connected with the "second face of power" argument
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). This posits that truly influential
groups are at work behind the scenes so that proposals con-
trary to their interests are never put on the decision agenda.
If this were true, we would not need to study interest group
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effectiveness, for it would be clear that interest groups visible
in the process were not key actors in the agenda-setting or
decision-making processes of government. Their actions
would be mere window-dressing to confuse the masses into
believing that their voices and actions (as reflected in interest
group activity) were meaningful.
While the power to control the agenda is clearly impor-
tant, the second face of power argument is not the end of the
story. Important issues of concern to various interests are pub-
licly debated and acted on by elected officials. The literature
on agenda setting notes that issues are put onto the decision
agenda in various ways, including crises or prominent events,
changes in widely respected indicators, a gradual accumula-
tion of knowledge and perspectives among specialists, and the
development of new technology (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 16-17).
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) describe how shifts in the way
an issue is viewed are instrumental in changing the political
agenda. Thus, exceptions to a powerful actor's ability to control
the agenda exist. Once a topic is on the agenda (whether by
interest group activity or other means), interest groups then
act to try to influence the outcome of the political battle. While
interest groups may not control the agenda, Kingdon (1995, p.
50) argues that they "affect the alternatives considered", surely
a significant type of power and one that might profitably be
investigated.
For researchers not dissuaded from approaching this dif-
ficult subject, different approaches have been tried in an effort
to measure interest group effectiveness. Similarly, review of
the extant literature reveals a variety of different statistical
methods used to identify the predictors of effectiveness and
to understand the interrelationships among them. This paper
presents research that adopts a different statistical technique to
re-test Hoefer's (2000) ordinary least squares (OLS) model of
interest group effectiveness in the Federal regulation-writing
process using structural equation modeling (SEM).
Although a number of other types of analysis have been used
in studying interest group power (notably, probit [Hojnacki
& Kimball, 1998; Wiggins, Hamm & Bell, 1992], logit [Evans,
1996], and regression analysis [Grenzke, 1989; Haider-Markel,
1999], as well as modeling based on game theory [Sloof, 1998]),
86 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
SEM has rarely, if ever, been used despite its potential advan-
tages. SEM is better in handling a dependent variable that is
continuous (not possible with probit and logit techniques) and
is better able to handle the multiple, overlapping variables
and indirect pathways involved in this analysis than is regres-
sion analysis. It also allows for confirmatory factor analysis to
ensure that the measured variables are truly aspects of their
respective theoretical constructs.
It is incumbent upon social work researchers to use the
best theory and the most powerful tools available to test our
understanding of phenomena of interest. Ordinary least
squares regression techniques are powerful, but SEM is able
to handle vexing issues that cannot be dealt with successfully
using OLS. While Hoefer (2000) is a good example of the use
of OLS, we believe the re-analysis of the data using structural
equation modeling is justified because SEM is a more power-
ful technique for taking into account "the modeling of inter-
actions, correlated independent variables, measurement error,
correlated error terms, [and] multiple latent independent vari-
ables, each measured by multiple indicators..." (Garson, 2002,
p. 1). SEM thus appears useful both to determine how robust
Hoefer's original results are and to facilitate a more precise
measurement of determinants using latent structures and mul-
tiple indicators that theory posits are important.
After describing past research to understand current think-
ing about measuring the concept of IGE and identifying the
oft-cited determinants, this paper describes the results of
testing the original model with SEM. Drawing from the inter-
est group literature over the past decade, an alternative model
with increased fit is proposed, which introduces new predic-
tors absent in the original model. Findings are then discussed
in the context of the existing literature and suggestions for
future directions of research are presented.
Measuring Interest Group Effectiveness (IGE)
Two major approaches to measuring IGE are well docu-
mented. The first is measuring a group's reputation and the
second is looking at "objective" indicators of influence, such as
votes or bureaucratic decisions. A third approach, asking the
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group itself how effective it is, is less common. Each strategy
has advantages and disadvantages.
Reputational studies ask respondents how much influence
particular other groups have. The logic behind this approach
is that other interest group leaders, legislators or other policy
actors have a sense of which groups are effective in achieving
their goals and which groups are not effective. In this way,
an interest group such as the National Rifle Association or the
American Association of Retired Persons can be rated among
the most powerful in their policy arena. The main advantag-
es of this approach are that it is relatively easy to obtain, and
is at least somewhat plausible. Unfortunately, it may be that
other groups or actors see only a portion of a group's whole
effort and may thus underestimate the group's impact. This
approach may also overestimate group power if the group is
caught in the currents of a legislative movement, riding the
wave, rather than having stirred the waters itself.
Objective indicators, such as counting how often legisla-
tors vote in accordance with an interest group's wishes, are
another way to measure IGE. The myriad studies of the effect
of Political Action Committees on votes in Congress or in com-
mittees provide examples of this approach. This approach has
a strong advantage in that the dependent variable is observ-
able and countable. This greatly aids statistical analysis of the
data collected. The downside of this approach is that it severe-
ly limits what is meant by interest group influence, thereby
reducing the types of decisions that can be studied.
A third approach, not often used, though employed in this
study (as in Hoefer, 2000 and Hoefer, 2005), is to ask group
leaders how effective their own groups are. This straightfor-
ward approach allows for group leaders to weigh all of their
efforts, both public and behind-the-scenes. It also allows for a
continuous dependent variable, thus aiding statistical analy-
sis. The major disadvantage to this approach is in not knowing
how accurate it is.
Several arguments can be used to support its use, however.
First, as controversy exists on how to measure the concept
of IGE, it seems reasonable to use a measure with consid-
erable face validity. Second, self-reported effectiveness is
useful because it moves us away from a simple "win-lose"
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perspective on government decision-making. Groups may
know a defeat is coming, but be able to soften the blow. This
should be considered as constituting an example of influence,
even if the overall result is not what the group desires (Evans,
1996; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). Finally, in the only empiri-
cal study where all three types of IGE measures (reputational,
objective and self-report) were collected on the same groups
(Hoefer, 1994a), the measures of objective and self-reported ef-
fectiveness were highly correlated (r = .758, p < .01). In the
present study, as in the original Hoefer (2000) OLS model, in-
terest group effectiveness consists of a single-item indicator,
which is operationalized as the interest group member's per-
ception of the percentage of time that the organization is con-
sidered to be successful in achieving its policy goals through
affecting regulations.
Determinants of IGE
According to Sloof (1998, p. 18), when discussing legisla-
tive policymaking, "most studies.. .report a significant influ-
ence of lobbying on policy." While some studies use a "black
box" approach to understanding what leads to this influence,
much of the literature on legislative policymaking describes
various factors that impede or increase an interest group's in-
fluence. Hoefer (2000) is one of the few to turn to a quantita-
tive analysis of these factors in the Federal regulation-writing
process. (For more details on the Federal regulation-writing
process, see Albert [1983], Hoefer [2000] or Kerwin [2003].)
Using ordinary least squares regression, Hoefer (2000) de-
termines that four factors influence interest group effective-
ness. These factors are both internal and external to the group
and can be categorized as: 1) group access to policymakers;
2) group policy positions; 3) group strategy; and 4) group re-
sources. While the original OLS model utilized single-item in-
dicators as predictors of interest group effectiveness, the alter-
native SEM aims to more fully define these complex constructs
by incorporating both latent factors and observed variables. A
short description of the literature in each of these areas follows.
In the interest of parsimony, the authors limit their discussion
to the extant literature around the effectiveness indicators
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proposed for the alternative structural equation model.
Although significant in the original OLS model, Group
Resources was not a significant determinant of IGE and was
thus eliminated from the final structural equation model. (For
a complete review of the original OLS model and findings, see
Hoefer [2000]).
Group Strategy
Two basic strategies for interest groups have been discussed
in the literature. These are the inside strategy and the outside
strategy (Walker, 1991). According to Walker (1991), neither
strategy is inherently better than the other; both are ways to
retain organizational viability, depending on the group's en-
vironment, membership and financing mechanisms. Hoefer
(1994b), however, found that the use of inside tactics leads to
greater levels of self-reported effectiveness in trying to affect
the executive branch. Recasting the concept of strategy into
when it is used in the regulation-writing process, Hoefer (2000)
finds that interest groups using a "pre-publication" strategy of
proactively bringing ideas regarding proposed regulations to
policymakers are more successful than are groups not using
that strategy. Using a pre-publication strategy is a conscious
choice by a group, as it takes an allocation of resources "up-
front" to research and prepare ideas for presentation to deci-
sion-makers. Even if the ideas are not immediately used in
the proposed regulation, the group is able to access the policy
actors involved and gain additional information regard-
ing what ideas are being considered. This allows the group
to modify its proposals to fit better into the agency's think-
ing. Hoefer's findings in the two manuscripts are consistent
because a pre-publication strategy is an inside strategy, as the
term is used by Walker (1991). (For more details on the regu-
lation-writing process and the various strategies that may be
used, see Hoefer, 2000).
On the basis of these findings, Hypothesis 1 is that greater
use of a "pre-publication" strategy will lead to greater effec-
tiveness. Related, Hypothesis 2 is that the more a group uses
a pre-publication strategy, the more access it will have to infor-
mation and policy actors.
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Group Position
One of the key aspects of interest groups is what they per-
ceive as their interests and thus what policy positions they
take. This has an impact on how effective they are, as groups
with positions outside of the mainstream or not in tune with
Congressional or Administration priorities are likely to have
less influence (Greenwald, 1977; Ziegler, 1964). Hoefer (2000)
found that the group's policy position was important in un-
derstanding a group's level of effectiveness. While the Clinton
administration is widely viewed as more "centrist" or "mod-
erate" than liberal (Stoesz, 1996), Clinton's government was
more apt to see increases in government programs and author-
ity in a favorable light than were the governments of Ronald
Reagan and George H. W. Bush, his immediate predecessors.
Because the data were collected at a time when President
Clinton was in office, Hypothesis 3 is that more liberal posi-
tions will lead to greater group effectiveness and Hypothesis
4 is that the more liberal a group's position, the more access it
will have to information and policy actors in the Clinton ex-
ecutive branch.
Group Context
Several authors suggest that the context within which the
interest group operates (particularly the level of conflict) is
an additional aspect of a group's situation that influences its
level of effectiveness (Walker, 1991). The more conflict in an
issue area, the less likely any group is to be effective (Evans,
1996). The existence of interest groups with opposing posi-
tions decreases interest group influence (Sloof, 1998). Wiggins,
Hamm and Bell (1992) show that elected officials can limit in-
terest group influence as well. Policymakers want compet-
ing interests to bring forth proposals that are acceptable to all
concerned. When no such acceptable compromise exists, deci-
sion-makers may try to delay a vote (Evans, 1996; Kingdon,
1989). Groups prefer to specialize in a narrow niche and to
avoid direct competition with other groups (Browne, 1990;
Walker, 1991). Given that the policy arena for the groups in
this study is human services, oftentimes seen as a redistribu-
tive type of policy, we may expect a fairly high level of conflict
to exist. Based on prior work, Hypothesis 5 is that the greater
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the level of conflict in the group's environment, the less effec-
tive it will be.
Group Access to Information and Policy Actors
One of the key elements of lobbying is gaining access to
and cooperation from policymakers (Rosenthal, 1993). Without
access, little effective lobbying can occur (Greenwald, 1977;
Culhane & Hacker, 1988). Hoefer (2000) shows that when
agency personnel contact interest groups to provide informa-
tion, interest group self-reported levels of effectiveness in-
crease. Access to policy actors is also potential access to greater
levels of information, as noted above. Thus, what might be
considered two separate variables are combined here into one
latent construct. On the basis of these findings, Hypothesis 6
proposes that higher levels of access to information and poli-
cymakers will lead to greater effectiveness.
In addition to this expected direct path between access
and IGE, it seems logical to believe that the degree of access
that a group has to information and policy actors is influenced
both by the strategy it uses and the positions it takes. As one
leader of a group interested in equal rights for gays, lesbians
and transgendered people said regarding the administration
of the first President George Bush: "We didn't even get in the
door of their offices." As such, Hypothesis 7 is that access to
information and policy actors will mediate the effect of strat-
egy on effectiveness. Related, Hypothesis 8 is that access to in-
formation and policy actors will mediate the effect of position
on effectiveness. In other words, we believe that strategy and
policy position have both direct effects on IGE (Hypotheses 2
and 4) as well as indirect effects through access to information
and policy actors.
Hypothesized Model
Coalescing the correlates of IGE, Figure 1 displays the
hypothesized structural equation model of interest group ef-
fectiveness. The causal ordering and specific hypotheses are
drawn from interest group theory and empirical precedents of
IGE.
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Methods
Data and Sample
The data originally used by Hoefer (2000) were collected in
1995 from Washington, D.C.-based interest group staff using a
mailed survey. In order to be included in the research, a group
needed to be active in social policy and attempt to influence
Figure 1. Hypothesized structural model of interest group
effectiveness.
both the legislative and executive branches. Groups were
initially identified through the 1993 Washington Information
Directory, published by Congressional Quarterly. A phone
contact was made to determine if the interest group met the
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criteria for inclusion in the study. At that time, the person
who was most responsible for trying to influence the executive
branch was determined. The survey was pre-tested on a small
number of organizations and 10 personal interviews were con-
ducted using the draft survey in order to improve and finalize
the instrument.
A typical mail survey process was used, with initial
mailing, post-card follow-up and a second full mailing to all
non-respondents after 3 weeks. A new survey was sent to re-
maining non-respondents after an additional 6 weeks. Of the
295 groups initially determined to fit the study criteria, usable
responses were received from 127 groups, for a response rate
of 43%, a very respectable return rate for surveys such as this.
Measures
In the present study, group strategy refers to an overall ap-
proach to influencing policy. This latent construct is comprised
of two of the three items from the original survey that were de-
signed to measure the "pre-publication" strategy. Confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) was used to select the following two indi-
cators: 1) work to bring shortcomings of current regulations to
the attention of executive branch agencies, and 2) offer drafts
of regulations prior to agency publication of proposed regula-
tions. Factor loadings were 0.90 and 0.58 respectively. Each
indicator is operationalized by responses on a 6-point, Likert-
type scale to questions regarding the importance of these orga-
nizational activities in achieving policy goals. Higher scores
reflect increased importance of the respective activities.
Group position is defined as the extent to which the group
advocates for a larger role for the federal government in solving
social problems, which we label as being a more "liberal" point
of view. Position consists of a latent factor with four indica-
tors, which were selected on the basis of construct validity
from among six items on the original survey. CFA produced
high factor loadings that ranged from 0.70 to 0.82. Each item is
operationally defined as the interest group leader's perception
of the organization's policy regarding the desired level of ex-
penditure by the federal government for health, social, housing
and civil rights services. Higher numbers correspond with an
organizational policy that supports an increased amount of
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
o It\ 0 0
clO Cn q (7'
L9 L9 L? L9
0 0 0 0
-A.
0.
t..
0 s '0
is,
N. a, m C.
L9~ L9~ L?~ L9
0
0 .
00
U 440
c-
Lq C9
I? 'IF
0
0 r
0 r
-0
0(~to
0)00)
0 ~
0.
.0
~
-Op
0)0)0
to-s ~
0
0) ~O II
to
~0-00 ~
0
0.
0
II
0 0 00'-
0 (.0.
00~
0 0
0
-0
000
0)
~ '00 -0 0)U..
to a
Q)
o0 0 "
0 .0
Q0)0
x z t C)
0 0 0
C O
-
C o~
ti rz tt
C0
"rs
0
o
to
0
0
to
to
Levers of Power
fA C9
z ' ;
,LII
,0C
0-0
MII a 0m
0mu
.4 s
. .
,, C Z- 0
00u 0
z
0
- OR
u -u
96 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
federal expenditures (i.e., a more liberal position).
Group context refers to the milieu in which the group is op-
erating, one which can be more or less conflictual. This con-
struct is a latent factor comprised of four observed indicators,
which were selected from among eight items on the original
survey using CFA. Factor loadings were moderate to high,
ranging from 0.56 to 0.86. The indicators were operationalized
by responses on a 5-point, Likert-type scale to questions con-
cerning the accuracy of proposed descriptive characteristics to
each respective organization. Higher scores indicate increased
accuracy of the respective organizational descriptions.
Group access to information and policy actors denotes the
extent to which a group has a variety of information sources
upon which to draw and have the ability to provide informa-
tion to agency decision-makers. Access is a latent construct
operationalized by four indicators, which were selected from
the original survey as the most theoretically relevant indicators
of an interest group's access to information and policy actors.
CFA produced factor loadings for these items that ranged from
0.53 to 0.87. Two of the four indicators were measured on 6-
point, Likert-type scales in which higher scores indicate that
accessing government agencies and reading the Federal Register
have increased importance. One variable was measured on a
5-point scale in which higher numbers connote an increased
number of attempts to communicate, consult or interact with
different cabinet departments and independent agencies. The
remaining variable was measured on a 4-point scale in which
higher values reflect an increased frequency of interactions
with federal agencies.
Interest group effectiveness (IGE) refers to the organization's
perceived success in achieving policy goals through influenc-
ing regulations. This single-item indicator is defined by re-
spondents' answers to the survey question: "Thinking about all
of the times your organization tries to achieve its policy goals
through affecting regulations, what percentage of the time do
you think it is successful?" Higher scores indicate a greater
percentage of perceived success. The operational definitions,
means and standard deviations for all variables in the SEM are
detailed in Table 1.
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Results
Analysis of Hoefer's Original OLS Model Using SEM
Hoefer's (2000) original OLS model was re-analyzed
using SEM. Given that the original model was not designed
as a structural model, it violates several of the assumptions of
SEM and clearly does not maximize this technique's unique
strengths. Nevertheless, the re-analysis is justified given the
aims of our paper. Slight differences in findings between the
OLS and the SEM models resulted from the analysis. While
two variables-degree of access and strategy-were stronger
determinants of interest group effectiveness in the SEM model,
the remaining predictors-policy position and resources-dis-
played weaker loadings than in the OLS model. Policy posi-
tion, which was a statistically significant predictor in the OLS
model, had a non-significant factor loading in relation to effec-
tiveness in the SEM model. Both models explained relatively
the same amount of variance in effectiveness (27% via OLS and
26% via SEM).
Overall, goodness-of-fit indicators for the structural model
indicate that the SEM is not a solid-fitting model. Due to the
influence of sample size on the chi-square goodness-of-fit sta-
tistic, Byrne (2001) suggests the ratio of the chi-square statistic
to the degrees of freedom (CMINDF) of less than 2.0 as an alter-
native indicator of a good-fitting model. The CMINDF value
for the SEM model was 7.9. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
was .958 (desired value above .90 or .95 by more conservative
estimates), while the RMSEA was far outside the desired range
at 0.234 (desired value < 0.05).
In light of these findings, we proceeded to develop an al-
ternative model that would take advantage of SEM's strengths
by creating latent factors for the original variables in the OLS
model from the literature on interest group effectiveness.
Additionally, the alternative structural equation model intro-
duces a new factor, policy context, which was absent from the
OLS model.
Analysis of Alternative Structural Equation Model for Interest
Group Effectiveness
Given that structural equation modeling is a multi-stage
98 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
process, confirmatory factor analysis was first used to deter-
mine whether the measured variables were considered to be
valid indicators of their underlying constructs (Bollen, 1989).
Factor loadings for all indicators in the three overidentified
measurement models-position, context and access-were
moderate to high and all loadings were statistically significant,
lending credence to the convergent validity of the indicators
(Hatcher, 1994). One measurement model-strategy-was un-
deridentified due to insufficient number of known data points,
yet was included in the full structural model on the basis of
content validity.
Figure 2. Hypothesized full model of interest group effectiveness.
(Note: All paths statistically significant at p<.05.)
Federal # agencies Frequency of Work with
register nteracted interaction gov agencies
ntense I Conflict Elected Org groups I
conflict erupts oppose oppose
The measurement models were combined into a full
latent variable model and a structural equation analysis was
conducted using the AMOS 5.0 program and the maximum
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Likelihood estimation method. The Full Information Maximum
Likelihood (FIML) method of estimation was used to handle
all missing data (Arbuckle, 1996). Missing data for this sample
were relatively low, ranging from 0 to 20% of the total number
of valid responses across all predictor variables. The full latent
model displayed in Figure 2 produced a testable, overidenti-
fled model with 83 degrees of freedom.
Table 2 presents the goodness-of-fit estimates for the full
model. Based on the measures of overall fit, there is evidence
that the hypothesized alternative model of interest group ef-
fectiveness is a sound-fitting model, considering the small
sample size used here. The CMINDF value of 1.3 is indica-
tive of a good-fitting model, demonstrating a considerable im-
provement in fit from the 7.9 value displayed in the first SEM
model of Hoefer's OLS re-analysis. The CFI and Incremental
Fit Index (IFI) were also both well above the acceptable cut-
off value, displaying values of .961 and .963, respectively.
The Normed Fit Index (NFI) constitutes a widely used crite-
rion within the literature, yet because this index tends to un-
derestimate fit when sample sizes are small, the IFI was pre-
ferred on the basis of the sample size used in this study. The
RMSEA of .050 reflects a good-fitting model and represents a
substantial improvement from the RMSEA value of .234 from
the first SEM model. The relatively narrow confidence interval
ranging from .017 to .074 indicates a high degree of precision
(Byrne, 2001). As such, one can be 90% confident that the true
RMSEA value in the population is located within the range
of .017 and .074. Finally, the overall R-Square for IGE in the
revised model was 0.301. Thus, the four hypothesized latent
constructs account for 30% of the variance in interest group ef-
fectiveness. Based on existing R2 values cited in the literature,
strategy, resources, position and access collectively account
for a total of 27% of the variation in interest group effective-
ness (Hoefer, 2000). One advantage of SEM over OLS here is
that given the use of latent constructs in SEM, the variance
modeled constitutes true latent variance since the measure-
ment error is excluded and modeled separately (Byrne, 2001).
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Table 2
Overall Goodness-of-Fit Estimates for Modeling Interest Group
Effectiveness
FIT INDEX ESTIMATE
Overall Chi Square (CMIN) 109.03
Degrees of Freedom (DF) 83
Significance (P) 0.029
Number of Parameters (NPAR) 52
Discrepancy/Degrees of Freedom (CMINDF) 1.31
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) .961
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) .963
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) .944
Normed Fit Index (NFI) .863
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) .050
RMSEA lower bound .017
RMSEA upper bound .074
Overall R-Square (for Interest Group Effectiveness) .301
With respect to the individually hypothesized relation-
ships among the variables in the revised model, the initial
speculations were fairly accurate. Standardized regression co-
efficients are listed in Table 3 and explained more fully below
by predictor variables.
The data failed to support our first hypothesis: greater
use of a "pre-publication" strategy will lead to greater effective-
ness. Group strategy was not found to positively impact ef-
fectiveness. However, the data did support our second spec-
ulation that the more a group uses a pre-publication strategy, the
more access it will have to information and policy actors. Results
showed that group strategy had a significant, positive effect
on access to information and policy actors, with a standard-
ized weight of 0.89 (p<.001). As the strongest coefficient in the
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model, the relationship between group strategy and access to
information and policy actors constitutes a unique contribu-
tion to the existing interest group literature, given that previous
studies have solely assessed the direct effects of group strategy
on interest group effectiveness, rather than possible indirect
effects through another mediating variable (Hoefer, 2000).
Table 3
Standardized and (Unstandardized) Parameter Estimates for the
Structural Model for Interest Group Effectiveness
Dependent Variables
Predictor Variables Access to Interest Group
Information and Effectiveness
Policy Actors
Strategy .892 (.902)***
Position .286 (.196)** -.262 (-4.167)*
Context -.233 (-4.827)*
Access to Information .503 (11.677)***
and Policy Actors
Strategy x Access .449
(Indirect Effect)
Position x Access .144
(Indirect Effect)
R2 .877 .301
* p<0.05 ** p:0.01 *** p<O.O01
Regarding the third hypothesis, more liberal positions will
lead to greater group effectiveness, contrary to what we expected,
position had a significant, negative impact on effectiveness.
The standardized effect of position on IGE was -0.26 (p<.05).
However, we did find support for our fourth hypothesis: the
more liberal a group's position, the more access it will have to infor-
mation and policy actors. Position was found to have a signifi-
cant, positive effect on access to information and policy actors,
with a standardized path of 0.29 (p<.01).
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The fifth hypothesis, the greater the level of conflict in the
group's environment, the less effective it will be, was also support-
ed by the data. Policy context was found to have a significant,
negative impact on overall levels of interest group effective-
ness, with a standardized weight of -0.23 (p<.05). This finding
also confirms earlier results found in the literature indicating
that conflict and opposition in the policy arena have a negative
effect on interest groups' perceived success levels in achieving
their policy goals through affecting regulations (Evans, 1996;
Sloof, 1998).
Likewise, we found support for our sixth hypothesis: higher
levels of access to information and policymakers will lead to greater
effectiveness. Indeed, access had a significant, positive effect
on IGE. The standardized structural path coefficient was 0.50
(p<.001). This, too, is in line with prior research (Hoefer, 2000;
Rosenthal, 1993).
Finally, the data also support our final two hypotheses on
the indirect effects of strategy and position on effectiveness:
access will mediate the effects of strategy (Hypothesis 7) and posi-
tion (Hypothesis 8) on effectiveness. As speculated, access sig-
nificantly and positively mediated the effects of strategy (0.45,
p<.001) and position (0.14, p<.05) on effectiveness. The indirect
effects of both constructs on IGE-mediated through access-
are novel findings within the interest group literature.
Discussion and Implications
The use of SEM to re-evaluate the same data analyzed with
OLS by Hoefer (2000) has led to some different results, high-
lighting the importance of continually testing our knowledge
base with the best analysis techniques possible. Of our eight
hypotheses, six are confirmed, one is found to be non-signifi-
cant and one is found to be the reverse of what we expected.
Hypothesis 2 (Prepublication strategy leads to greater
access), Hypothesis 4 (Liberal position leads to greater
access), Hypothesis 5 (Conflict leads to less effectiveness) and
Hypothesis 6 (Greater access leads to higher effectiveness) are
all confirmed. As these are all well-grounded in the literature,
this is welcome news. In some ways, these results seem like
"common sense" but they have important implications for
social work advocates.
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First, related to Hypothesis 5, we must strive to eliminate
conflict if we want to achieve our goals. Working within co-
alitions and moving across old boundaries of conflictual rela-
tionships are important tools for our advocacy. At the same
time, when other groups are active, pushing proposals that are
inimical to client interests, we can see that it pays to be a very
squeaky wheel, as conflict can bring a halt to further regula-
tory action, making the other group less effective.
Another implication is that what social work interest
groups choose to do in terms of the strategy they use and the
positions they take has a significant impact on whether they
can get in the door of policymakers' offices and gain access
to the information there (Hypotheses 2 and 4). Thus, in the
regulation-writing process, becoming involved before the regu-
lations are published in the Federal Register is vital. Efforts
must be made to understand the importance of this part of the
policy process, to influence or at least find out to which agency
the regulation is being assigned for writing and whom the lead
author will be. A relationship should then be created quickly
so that the group's ideas are able to be put into the process. Of
course, all this advice presupposes that the organization has
ideas developed and ready to promote. All of these actions are
under the control of the organization's leadership.
In addition, the results clearly show that having access to
information and policy actors makes an important difference
in how effective a group perceives itself to be. While social
work groups clearly do not want to compromise their values,
it pays to understand how important the positions taken and
the strategy used are for getting results.
Hypothesis 1 (Strategy choice affects effectiveness di-
rectly) was not supported by the data. In combination with
support for Hypotheses 2 and 7, however, we find that choice
of strategy is important, but not directly. While a bit surpris-
ing, this result shows the importance of using the best analyti-
cal methods available. Previous research did not tease out the
important mediating effect of access to information and policy
actors. Structural Equation Modeling has shown its usefulness
in providing a clearer picture of the relationships between the
concepts explored here and in previous research. As noted
earlier, access is vital to achieving success within an "inside" or
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"pre-publication" strategy. Without access, there is no chance
of presenting ideas or having them inserted into policy. The
results thus reinforce the idea that access is vital if an inside
strategy, such as the pre-publication strategy, is to be effective.
The most surprising finding is that a group's more liberal
position directly leads to less, rather than more perceived ef-
fectiveness, which was what we predicted in Hypothesis 3.
Again, SEM has provided us a valuable insight not seen before
in the literature. More liberal positions are associated with
working with more agencies, seeing them more frequently
and believing these connections are more important; but these
liberal positions, in and of themselves, lead to less effective-
ness in affecting regulations.
A possible explanation for these apparently contradictory
findings is that there is a bit of a gap in the executive branch
between the civil servants working on the regulations and the
political appointees who make the final decisions. The civil
servants who interact with interest group representatives may
themselves be more liberal than those above them in the hier-
archy who are beholden to the President for their jobs. Because
President Clinton was a centrist, trying to balance liberal and
conservative views in order to maintain his influence over
social policy issues, groups that were "too liberal" may have
found themselves coming up short when the overall policy
decisions were made by political appointees (not the civil ser-
vants with whom the interest groups would have worked).
One example of President Clinton's balancing-act proclivi-
ties can be seen in his signing the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). This
law dismantled the entitlement program Aid to Families with
Dependent Children and created the Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families program, a policy decision which many liber-
als decried. It should be remembered that President Clinton
faced Republican majorities in the House and Senate from
1994 to 2000, which was during most of his two terms in office.
This finding and possible explanation indicate how important
it is to social workers to have people in the White House and in
Congress who have a strong mandate to work on progressive
social issues. It makes an important difference for us and our
clients who is in office.
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Finding that a group's more liberal policy positions are
related to its effectiveness only when mediated by access is
an important contribution to the literature. Practically speak-
ing, it implies that groups with access may be creating "inter-
nal lobbyists," that is, civil servants who can argue for more
liberal regulations on a constant basis from within the agency.
Providing these civil servants with convincing data and ar-
guments to counteract their politically motivated bosses (of
whatever party) may be one of the most important roles that
human service advocates can play in trying to influence the
executive branch.
Every study has its limitations, however, and these must
be acknowledged. First, from a methodological perspective,
the use of several skewed variables and a small sample size
inhibits our ability to generalize the model to the larger popu-
lation. The results would also be more generalizable if the re-
sponse rate were higher. Another methodological limitation
is the nature of the data themselves. The variables are all self-
reported measures and are open to the biases any self-reported
data may have. Finally, changes in the political environment
happening since these data were collected may lead to differ-
ent results. Thus, until further data collection is done, these
results should be considered somewhat tentative.
Conclusion
Despite the study limitations, this paper has important
implications, both for social work practitioners and for social
work researchers. Substantively, it presents information
that largely confirms the previous literature and adds addi-
tional nuances to other parts. As budget deficits created by
tax cuts and foreign wars wreak havoc on social spending at
the federal level, leaving millions of program recipients with
fewer resources, the study of how interest groups and social
workers in general can impact the policy process becomes ever
more important. Using limited resources as effectively as pos-
sible becomes not just important, but the "right thing to do."
Research such as this, using the best data and analytical tools
available, should lead current practitioners to perform their
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jobs better.
This paper also challenges social work researchers. It il-
lustrates that the choice of analytical technique is important
and we should always be willing to test our past understand-
ing by subjecting our data-derived conclusions to further scru-
tiny using more advanced analytical methods. Understanding
what techniques are appropriate and translating results into
best practices for practitioners becomes more important as
analytical techniques become more complex. As always, the
most important message to researchers is to keep skills sharp
and models flexible. Moving forward with theory-based re-
search and the most powerful appropriate tools available, we
can then have findings that can be translated into evidence-
based practice guidelines. This process is vital for all of us af-
fected by the social work profession, whether we are research-
ers, practitioners, clients or policymakers.
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